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 Review of 
 Personal Value, T. Rønnow-Rasmussen 
 
(to appear in Dialectica) 
 
Toni, Rønnow-Rasmussen: Personal Value, Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2011, 185 
pp.  75 $$ (Hardcover), ISBN 978-0-19-960378-7  
 
 
The poem that his daughter once wrote for him is valuable for Toni Rønnow-
Rasmussen in a way that it is not for others. But saying that the poem is valuable for him 
is not the same as saying that it is valuable according to him. First, because it cannot be 
prejudged that the poem would not be valuable for him had he no knowledge of it. 
Second, because even if the poem could not be valuable for him without being valuable 
according to him, they are plenty of other things that he might find valuable without 
finding them valuable for him. Personal values, Rønnow-Rasmussen argues, are therefore 
not to be equated with mere subjective values: they are rather kinds of values⎯good 
for⎯to be contrasted with impersonal values⎯good, period. They constitute the 
explananda of Personal Value. 
The explanans Rønnow-Rasmussen puts forward has two ingredients:  
1. The fitting (or buck-passing) analysis of values (FA), according to which an 
object’s positive value consists in there being normative reasons to favour that 
object. These reasons are provided by lower-order properties of the value-bearer, 
which constitute the supervenience base of the value (not to be conflated with its 
constitutive ground, as we shall see).  
2. A sui generis type of attitude: for-someone’s-sake-attitudes, attitudes we have 
towards objects “with some person in mind”. Such attitudes are meant to be simple: 
favouring the poem for Toni’s sake is not having a first attitude towards the poem 
and a second attitude towards Toni; is it one single attitude: favouring the poem 
with an eye to Toni.  
Combining these two ingredients, Rønnow-Rasmussen proposes the following Fitting 
Analysis of Personal value (FAP) :  
FAP: An object x’s value for a person a (i.e. x’s personal value), consists in the 
existence of normative reasons for favouring/disfavouring x for a’s sake (Rønnow-
Rasmussen, 2011, 47).  
FAP is meant to be very encompassing. Rønnow-Rasmussen explains how FAP can be 
refined so as to distinguish, for instance, final from instrumental personal values, or 
intrinsic from extrinsic personal values. Moreover, in the course of his defence of FAP, 
the Danish/Swedish philosopher persistently points out that FAP remains neutral with 
respect to many substantive issues. Thus, FAP does not say which things are of personal 
value; neither does FAP say whether there are some things of personal value; FAP is even 
neutral with respect to the subjectivism/objectivism issue concerning personal values. 
One could endorse FAP and be a subjectivist about personal values: in order to do so, one 
would need to adopt a subjective rather than objective stance on the reasons figuring in 
the analysans. 
There is, however, one substantial view about personal values that FAP readily rules 
out. Naïve realism about personal values is the view that personal values are unanalysable 
axiological properties of their bearers. The naïve realist about personal values adopts 
towards personal values the kind of approach that Moore adopts towards impersonal 
values. Surprisingly, Rønnow-Rasmussen never seriously considers naïve realism about 
personal values1. Even if naïve realism about personal values is ignored, and entailed to 
be false, the naïve realist can still find much to agree with in Personal Value. For he 
might accept the bi-conditional underlying FAP: x is good for a iff x ought to be favoured 
for a’s sake. Such a naïve realist will say, in contrast to FAP, that it is because the poem 
is good for Toni that Toni ought to favour it for his own sake.  
Personal Value contains ten chapters. In spite of the impressive range of issues 
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  One	  reason	  is	  perhaps	  that	  Moore	  himself	  rejected	  primitive	  personal	  values.	  Yet	  naïve	  realism	  about	  personal	  value	  is	  not	  entirely	  unprecedented:	  Hartmann	  (1932,	  vol.	  1,	  206-­‐9)	  defends	  some	  platonistic	  version	  of	  it.	  
covered, the book displays a tight unity: with the exception of Chapter Ten⎯which 
presents a novel argument in favour of value-bearer pluralism⎯all other chapters closely 
pursue the defence of FAP. Chapter One sets the stage by introducing important 
axiological distinctions, in particular the distinction between the supervenience base and 
the constitutive ground of a value. Chapters Two, Three and Five introduce and defend 
the two key ingredients of FAP: Chapters Two and Three focus on FA and some central 
objections to it; Chapter Five focuses on for someone’s sake attitudes. Chapter Six 
integrates the results of the preceding chapters so as to spell out FAP in detail. Chapters 
Seven and Eight address important objections to FAP. Chapters Four and Nine consider 
and rebut alternative approaches to personal values (Moore’s skepticism with respect to 
personal value; the view that x is good for S iff x ought to be favoured because S favours 
x; and the view that personal values amount to agent-relative values). 
Although the book on the whole forms a remarkably integrated whole, its fine-grained 
organisation is occasionally murkier. The unity of some chapters is not obvious, some 
issues recur in different chapters (such as Moorean objections to personal value), and 
questions are often pinpointed as “to be dealt with later” (though they always are). Even 
so, Personal Values is a delightful and enlightening read. It is teeming with novel 
insights, ground-breaking distinctions, rich examples, new delineations of the field, 
refreshing historical reminders, inventive arguments, unprecedented connections, 
identifications of neglected difficulties, and pioneering proposals. 
I shall focus here on three of these insights, which are illustrative of the pervasive 
scrupulousness and inventiveness of the book. The first is that there is a distinction 
between the supervenience base of values and their constitutive grounds. The second is 
that FA is admittedly circular (because pro-attitudes have values as formal objects), but 
that this circularity is benign. The third proposal is that one important kind of for-
someome-sake’s attitude⎯prototypically, love⎯is such that it is not justified by the 
properties it represents its object as exemplifying. This is a small sample of claims not 
meant to be representative of the book. The reason I have chosen to discuss these in 
particular is that, while finding them plausible and significant, I believe that each raises a 
worry that Rønnow-Rasmussen fails to address properly. I shall tentatively suggest a 
possible solution in each case. 
 
1. Supervenience base and constitutive ground 
One might be tempted to think that a subjectivist about values⎯the view that for x to be 
good is for x to be the object of some pro-attitude⎯is committed to the view that pro-
attitudes belong to the supervenience base of positive values. Subjectivism would thereby 
entail that all values are extrinsic. Rønnow-Rasmussen points out (Chap. 1) that this way 
of understanding subjectivism is misleading. If it were true, subjectivism and objectivism 
would not be offering competing accounts of intrinsic values. Instead, subjectivism would 
simply be denying the possibility of intrinsic values. This is bad news no so much for 
subjectivism itself than for our very understanding of the subjectivism/objectivism 
debate. Our framing of the debate should be such that the subjectivist and the objectivist 
are in a position to disagree on the nature of intrinsic values.  
To deal with this worry⎯and further ones⎯Rønnow-Rasmussen introduces an 
important distinction, from earlier works with Wlodek Rabinowicz (Rabinowicz and 
Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2000) between the supervenience base of values, and their 
constitutive grounds (pp. 9–18). All values, he claims, supervene, a priori, on lower-order 
properties (typically, natural properties). Constitute grounds, Rønnow-Rasmussen urges, 
should not be conflated with supervenience bases. The subjectivist and the objectivist 
about values might agree on the supervenience base of a given value; but they will 
disagree on its constitutive ground: for the subjectivist, the subject’s attitudes will belong 
to that constitutive ground, for the objectivist the constitutive ground and the 
supervenience base will be equated (pp. 13–18). Hence, the distinction between the 
supervenience base and constitutive grounds helps explain why the subjectivist is not 
committed to all values being extrinsic, and why the subjectivist and the objectivist might 
agree on the supervenience base of intrinsic values.  
The distinction between the supervenience base and constitutive grounds is very 
illuminating. However, intuitively, it faces an important dilemma:  
• Either the supervenience base is sufficient for the value to accrue to its bearer, but 
then the constitutive ground is superfluous. The subjectivist’s attitudes play no 
role; values are there anyway.  
• Or the supervenience base is not sufficient for the value to accrue to its bearer, but 
then is it not properly speaking a supervenience base.  
In other words, the supervenience base and the constitutive ground seem to be competing 
grounds for the value. Although Rønnow-Rasmussen speaks of “supervenience”, he 
insists that he wants to capture some stronger relation: all values accrue to their bearer in 
virtue of some lower-order properties (p. 11). Rønnow-Rasmussen keeps the “ground” 
talk for constitutive grounds, but in effect the supervenience base is also a ground of the 
value⎯and it has to be a complete ground. Subjectivism is then equated with the view 
that although lower-order properties completely ground axiological ones, some further 
subjective attitudes are needed, on top of these complete natural grounds, to constitutively 
ground the value. This sounds inconsistent: if further attitudes are needed to ground the 
values, then the “supervenience” base is not completely grounding the value.  
Let me hazard two possible ways of rescuing the supervenience base/constitutive 
ground distinction from this dilemma (both are inspired by some comments made by 
Rønnow-Rasmussen, though I am not sure he would endorse either of them). 
(i) The first distinguishes between subjective and objective grounds. The subjectivist 
might say that a value is intrinsic when, in the eyes of the subject, the lower-order 
properties of the bearers completely ground its values. Of course, the subject is then 
wrong, for according to subjectivism, his own attitudes also ground the value. 
Subjectivism, then, could equate intrinsic values with the values that (wrongly) seem to 
supervene on the lower-order properties of the bearer. The supervenience base would be 
equated with the subjective complete ground of values (which excludes the attitude); the 
constitutive ground would be equated with the objective ground (which includes the 
attitude). The supervenience base is subjectively sufficient for the value to be 
exemplified, but the constitutive ground is objectively required. Although the subjectivist 
would then be committed to the view that all values are extrinsic, he could still be in a 
position to make sense of the concept of intrinsic value. 
(ii) A second, perhaps better, way out of the dilemma appeals to embedded grounds. 
The idea is to understand the supervenience base/constitutive ground distinction in terms 
of an explanation embedded in another. The subjectivist’s view would amount to the 
following:  
      
Subjectivism:
 
(values accrue to their bearers completely in virtue of their natural base) in virtue 
of some subjective attitudes.  
Within the bracket is the first order view, on which subjectivists and objectivists (might) 
agree. Outside the brackets lies the (meta-ethical) battlefield: objectivism denies the 
outer, wide-scope, “in virtue of”. The reason why the subjectivist’s constitutive grounds 
for values⎯attitudes⎯do not belong to their supervenience base is akin to the reason 
why the modus ponens is not itself a premise of the modus ponens. The subjectivist’s 
attitudes are supposed to explain why values supervene on the lower-order properties 
they do; they do not belong themselves to these lower-order properties. Although 
Rønnow-Rasmussen does not make this suggestion explicitly, it seems in line with his 
claim that subjectivism and objectivism are second-order, meta-ethical, views on values. 
This suggestion, however, clashes with the letter of some other claims he makes: for 
according to it, the subjectivist’s view is not that attitudes constitutively ground values, 
but that attitudes ground the fact that natural properties ground values. 
2. Formal objects and circularity  
In Chapter 2, Rønnow-Rasmussen recalls an objection to the fitting-analysis of value 
(FA⎯the first ingredient of FAP) from W.D. Ross, according to which pro-attitudes are 
value-loaded in the following sense: to have a pro-attitude towards x entails thinking that 
x is good in some way. Pro-attitudes, in scholastic jargon, have formal objects: 
judgments, thoughts, or presentations of values. But if pro-attitudes essentially involve 
evaluations, the objection goes, then any conceptual analysis of values in terms of pro-
attitudes is doomed to circularity, for the concept of value is implicitly present in the 
analysandum. 
Rønnow-Rasmussen, in his relentless quest for neutrality, intends to answer Ross’s 
objection without rejecting the view that pro-attitudes essentially involve evaluations. He 
therefore consistently concedes that no definition of values in terms of pro-attitudes can 
be given. What then could be the point of FA?  
Relying on a proposition given by Skorupski (2007), Rønnow-Rasmussen argues that 
without defining values, one can nevertheless give an account of the possession or 
acquisition of value-concepts in terms of pro-attitudes (pp. 31–2). The proposed story 
runs as follows. Start with Paul, who does not yet grasp the concept of moral wrongness. 
Since the attitude of blame, ex hypothesis, essentially involves negative moral evaluation, 
explaining to Paul that the morally wrong amounts to the blame-worthy⎯following 
FA⎯will be of no help to him. But, Skorupski and Rønnow-Rasmussen argue, Paul can 
become familiar with blame through an “independent characterization” that brackets its 
evaluative component. In particular, Paul can individuate the sentiment of blame through 
the way blame feels or through the actions blame disposes him to perform. Once familiar 
with blame in this evaluation-free way, Paul can then judge that some instances of blame 
are supported by reasons. That is, he can grasp the idea of blame-worthiness, i.e., the idea 
of moral wrongness. This way, Paul has acquired the concept of moral value through 
blame, although blame essentially involves moral evaluation. So goes the proposal. 
Accordingly, FA should be read as a theory about the possession or acquisition of value-
concepts, rather than as a definition of values. 
I find this answer unconvincing. First, that the subjective feel of blame is value-free is 
questionable. Evaluations⎯presentations, feelings, or perceptions of values⎯have long 
been claimed to be essential to the phenomenology of emotions.  
But let us grant that some “independent characterization” of blame (through some 
value-free subjective feel or action tendencies) is possible. Note that with such a 
characterization in hand, Paul remains ignorant of the essential evaluative aspect of 
blame: all he knows about blame is its value-free feel or its action tendencies. Hence, to 
say that he has thereby become familiar with blame is a bit of an overstatement: a more 
cautious claim would be that Paul has thereby become familiar with some parts or 
aspects of blame (namely: its feel, its action-tendencies). But if so, it becomes doubtful 
that Paul can judge that such blame-aspects are worthy or fitting. For first, it is unclear 
that such evaluation-free aspects of blame are supported by reason; and second, if they 
are supported by reason, then they plausibly are so because of the evaluative aspect of 
blame. Remove all evaluation from blame: whatever the residue is, it is unlikely that it 
can meaningfully be said to be a fitting or unfitting attitude. Hence Paul, who, ex 
hypothesis, does not access the evaluative part of blame, might not after all be in a 
position to judge that its non-evaluative parts⎯the only ones he knows of⎯are fitting or 
unfitting. 
But let us grant that the concept of blame-worthiness can nevertheless be acquired 
this way. Then a third problem arises: for what does the concept blame-worthiness have 
to do with that of moral wrongness? Recall that Rønnow-Rasmussen and Skorupski have 
agreed, in order to avoid vicious circularity, that moral wrongness cannot be defined in 
terms of blame-worthiness. So on what grounds are we to claim that if Paul grasps blame-
worthiness, he is thereby “in a position to grasp moral wrongness” (p. 32)?  The 
definitional bridge between values and fitting attitudes has just been destroyed. Lacking 
any other another bridge, values remain out of reach. Paul has acquired the concept of a 
fitting-attitude. But has still no idea about values. 
Finally, let us grant that FA can still be read as providing a story about the acquisition 
of value-concepts rather than a story about the acquisition of fitting-attitude concepts. Yet 
another worry is thrown up. For FA, so construed, cannot even claim to explain how we 
actually come to possess value-concepts. The only thing that has been argued for is that 
there is a possibly non-circular way of explaining the acquisition of value concepts in 
terms of fitting attitudes. No argument has been given to the effect that this route to 
value-concepts is the only one, nor that it is even an actual one. Nothing excludes that 
values can be accessed more directly: by intuition, emotions, feelings, etc. This is very 
disappointing: we were promised a fitting analysis of values, and we end with a shaky 
story about one possible way of acquiring value-concepts. 
In fact, Rønnow-Rasmussen himself seems to have higher ambitions for FA. In spite 
of his official adhesion to the “acquisition” reading of FA, he keeps on writing as if the 
analysis of values is really at stake. Outside of the discussion of Ross’s objection, he 
continues to formulate FA in terms of “values” (not “value-concepts”) being “constituted 
by”, “equated with”, “identical with”, or “analyzed in terms of” the existence of reasons 
to favour their bearer. Nowhere else in the book do we find FA spelled out in terms of 
value-concepts being acquired in virtue of the existence of reason to favour their bearer. 
Personal values, not the acquisition of the concept of personal values, are the real 
explananda of the book⎯and rightly so. 
There is perhaps a better way out of Ross’s objection. Rather than endorsing the 
possession-reading of FA, Rønnow-Rasmussen could join forces with Humberstone 
(1997), as he did in earlier papers (see in particular Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 
2006), and to whom he ends up alluding (p. 32, n. 44). Humberstone agrees that it is 
indeed badly circular to define (“reductively analyse” in his terminology) the concept F 
by appealing to F itself. But instead of moving towards an account of the possession of 
the concept F as an alternative, Humberstone suggests that we can explain, not what the 
concept consists in, but when its applies. His proposal, as I understand it, is that although 
the intension of the concept cannot be accounted for if the concept figures in the right-
hand side of the explanation, its extension can still be accounted for in that way provided 
the concept appears under the scope of a “protective” operator. Suppose “S blames x” 
essentially involves “x seems morally wrong to S”. This indeed forbids defining moral 
wrongness in terms of blame. But one can still non-vacuously explain when the concept 
of moral wrongness applies in terms of blame, for “S blames x” does not involve “x is 
morally wrong”, but only “x seems morally wrong”. “Seem”, not being factive, is a 
protective operator.  
This possible reply to Ross, however, still focuses on value concepts, not yet on value 
properties. As such, it remains at odds with the general metaphysical inflection of 
Personal Value. But perhaps Humberstone’s story has a metaphysical counterpart. 
Distinguishing the nature of values from their existence, one might grant that their nature 
cannot be elucidated in terms of pro-attitudes, because of Ross’s circularity worry. But, 
one might then urge, their existence still stands in need of explanation. Such an 
explanation, on this proposal, is precisely what FA provides. FA does not account for 
what values are, but for the conditions under which values exist, i.e. are exemplified. 
Although the nature of goodness is left unexplained by FA, what we learn through FA is 
when and how this unexplained goodness accrues to some bearers: namely, when there 
are reasons to favour these bearers. In other words, FA could be understood as saying that 
a value (whose nature is not addressed⎯it could be primitive or not) is exemplified by a 
bearer, iff, and because, this bearer is worthy of being favoured. FA, in short, tells us not 
what values are, but how values land on their bearers. 
How does that answer Ross’s objection?  Crucially, the appearances, seemings, or 
presentations of values admittedly essential to pro-attitudes, are not factive: seeming good 
does not entail being good. Hence, no bad circularity ensues from explaining 
exemplifications of values (partly) through presentations of values. In sum, a more 
promising answer to Ross’s objection, hopefully in tune with the spirit of Personal Value, 
could be to concede that FA does not account for the nature of value, but to insist that it 
only targets their existence, therefore avoiding any vicious circularity. 
3. Love and butterflies 
For-one-sake’s attitudes (FSS) constitute one of the main innovations of Personal Values. 
After having characterized FSS attitudes in detail, Rønnow-Rasmussen introduces a 
distinction between two kinds of FSS whose paradigmatic examples are admiration and 
love. When Paul admires Julie, the properties of Julie represented in the content of his 
attitude provides an answer to the question “Why⎯for what reason⎯does he admire 
her?”. When Paul loves Julie, on the other hand, the properties of Julie represented in the 
content of his attitude do not provide reason for his love: they only help to identify the 
beloved. Paul admires Julie because she is courageous, but he does not love her because 
she has blond hair2. Love is not justified by the represented properties of the beloved: “we 
do not so much love a person for his or her properties as we love her regardless of his and 
her properties”, “we are struck by the attitude”, “we find ourselves merely having it”, we 
have it “for no reason”; things we cannot say about admiration.  
More generally, there is then a distinction between FSS attitudes that are justified by 
the properties they represent their object as having (like admiration), and, on the other 
hand FSS attitudes that are not justified by such properties (like love). In the later case, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  As	  Rønnow-­‐Rasmussen	  stresses,	  the	  “because”	  in	  question	  is	  not	  the	  causal	  because,	  but	  the	  because	  of	  justification.	  
the properties attributed to the object only play the role of identifiers, not of justifiers. 
Rønnow-Rasmussen calls such love-like attitudes “Identity-FSS attitudes”, and he argues 
further that they are likely to be the ones at play in the most interesting cases of personal 
values (hence, the final formulation of FAP, p. 78, makes clear that the pro-attitude 
appearing in the analysans are Identity-FSS attitudes). 
That distinction between two kinds of FSS is plausible and illuminating. One worry, 
however, of which Rønnow-Rasmussen is aware, is that the idea that love lacks justifiers 
appears to clash with the view that values supervene, as a matter of conceptual necessity, 
on non-evaluative properties. As Rønnow-Rasmussen insists (pp. 10–11), values are not 
butterflies: they do not directly alight on they bearers. It is a matter of conceptual 
necessity that they alight on their bearers in virtue of the lower-order, typically non-
evaluative, properties of such bearers. But if love is an identity-FSS attitude, then to love 
corresponds some butterfly value, which alights on the beloved without further ado, 
independently of any non-evaluative ground. How are we to reconcile love, and other 
Identity-FSS attitudes, with the view that value supervenes, as a matter of conceptual 
necessity, on the property of their bearers?  
Rønnow-Rasmussen’s answer is that values, in such cases, supervene not on the 
person’s properties, but instead on the person’s identity: “It is not my beloved’s 
possession of the property W that justifies my love for him or her. Rather, it is the identity 
of the person that appears to have that function” (p. 70). A person can be “what value 
supervene on” (Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2008, §6).  
The problem with this answer is that by allowing substances to count as 
supervenience bases, we end up blurring the distinction between higher-order properties 
(such as values) and some butterfly, first-order, properties. Properties that accrue to their 
bearer in virtue of these bearers themselves, or because of the identity of such bearers are 
not necessarily supervenient properties. They might be essential properties (admittedly, 
not all essential property are supervenient). Rønnow-Rasmussen’s proposal entails that 
there are two ways in which properties can be exemplified by their bearers independently 
of any lower-order property. First, the butterfly way: properties alighting directly on their 
bearer. Second, the personal value way: properties accruing to their bearer in virtue of 
these bearer themselves, or, in virtue of the identity of these bearers. In the case of 
essential properties, this sounds like a distinction without a difference.  
How else, then, can the view that love is an Identity-FSS be reconciled with the view 
that values, as a matter of conceptual necessity, accrue to their bearer in virtue of some 
non-evaluative ground? An alternative suggestion is to weaken the supervenience 
constraint, which Rønnow-Rasmussen equates with full grounding. The proposal is to 
replace it, in the case of love and related personal values, by partial grounding. What is 
special about love (and other Identity-FSS attitudes) is that love is only partly justified or 
grounded by the properties of the beloved. Romeo loves Juliet partly because of her eyes, 
hair, and sense of humour3, but not only because of these. Hence, in accordance with the 
supervenience intuition, the personal value that Juliet has for Romeo is not free-floating. 
There are normative reasons why Romeo loves Juliet. But, contrary to the supervenience 
intuition, these reasons are not jointly sufficient to explain his love. There is something 
unexplainable about Romeo’s love. Love has some necessary, but no sufficient 
correctness conditions. That the supervenience intuition should be revised in the case of 
personal values is hardly surprising. A perfect duplicate of the drawing of Toni’s 
daughter cannot be more or less beautiful or admirable than the original. But, as Rønnow-
Rasmussen touches upon (p. 81), is it very likely to be less valuable for Toni. 
To conclude, it should be stressed that none of quibbles above could have been raised 
had Rønnow-Rasmussen confined himself to a narrow defence of FAP. After all, FAP 
could have been defended while leaving it to the subjectivists and objectivists to identify 
the subject-matter matter of their disagreement; to the emotion theorists to reconcile FA 
with the view that emotions have values as formal objects; and to the philosopher of love 
to account for love’s correctness conditions. Rønnow-Rasmussen’s defence of FAP, by 
contrast, is supererogatory. All too often, value theorists analysing values in terms of 
emotions tend to shift the responsibility for a value-free analysis of emotions to 
philosophers of mind; and, on the other hand, emotions theorists analysing emotions in 
terms of values tend to shift the responsibility for an emotion-free conception of value to 
their fellow axiologists. By contrast, Personal Value never passes the buck. The analysis 
of personal values proposed significantly furthers our mapping of the mind. One main 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Pace	  Rønnow-­‐Rasmussen,	  such	  properties	  are	  not	  doomed	  to	  be	  only	  causes	  of	  his	  love,	  they	  might	  be	  genuine	  reasons	  for	  it.	  
achievement of the book is the characterization of an overlooked psychological kind, for-
someone’s-sake attitudes, which might constitute a genuine discovery. In this respect, as 
in many others, Personal Value should be of immense interest not only to value theorists 
and moral philosophers, but also to philosophers of mind and metaphysicians.  
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